United States v. Toscanino: An Assault on the Ker-Frisbie Rule by Schons, Gary W.
Comments
UNITED STATES v. TOSCANINO:
AN ASSAULT ON THE KER-FRISBIE RULE
INTRODUCTION
Visions of a troop of Black Jack Pershing's cavalry frothing across
the Rio Grande in hot pursuit of Mexican raiders, or a trench-coat
clad American secret agent waiting in a Berlin train station to collar
an enemy sympathizer are the stuff movies are made of.1 What
these movies omit, and what our courts refuse to consider, is the
manner in which these fugitives, once apprehended, are returned
to the United States to stand trial for their crimes.2
1. See, e.g., Chandler v. United States, 171 F.2d 921 (1st Cir. 1948);
Dominguez v. State, 90 Tex. Crim. 90, 234 S.W. 79 (1921).
2. In addition, the courts of our nation refuse to review the regularity
of proceedings which result in the return of a fugitive to a state from an-
other state. See, e.g., Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1953); Eaton v. West
Virginia, 91 F. 760 (4th Cir. 1898). However, due to limited time and space,
this Comment will limit its examination to the problems inherent in interna-
tional situations.
When accomplished pursuant to legal proceedings, the interstate sur-
render of fugitives is known as rendition; the surrender of fugitives between
nations pursuant to a treaty is known as extradition. While the terms are
sometimes used interchangeably, this Article will adhere to their proper
usage. See Kopelman, Extradition and Rendition-History, Law, Recom-
mendations, 14 B.U.L. REv. 591 (1934); Comment Interstate Rendition and
the Fourth Amendment, 24 RTuTGERS L. REv. 551 n.1 (1970). Forty-seven
of the fifty states have adopted the UiFoim CnVmIAL ExTRADrrION ACT,
11 UNIFORm LAws AwN. 51 (1974), which controls interstate rendition pro-
cedure. South Carolina and Mississippi have no provisions for the rendition
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Modem technology and trade have transformed the neighborhood
rackets operator into a broad ranging and internationally-based
criminal syndicate. Criminals today-trafficking in narcotics,
gambling, illegal securities and stolen property-are not only inter-
state, but international travelers. In addition, local offenders enjoy
easy access to the means of escape across national boundaries. The
circumstance of finding a person wanted for domestic criminal pro-
ceedings at large in a foreign jurisdiction is today a common oc-
currence.s Nevertheless, our courts, almost without exception,
have refused to examine the regularity of the proceedings by which
these fugitives, once captured, are returned to the United States
for trial.
This Comment will examine the so-called Ker-Frisbie4 rule under-
lying the position of our courts' refusal to review the claims of those
who challenge the personal jurisdiction of a court subsequent to
an extra-legal transfer from a foreign jurisdiction.5 The analysis
herein will reveal the basic weakness of the rule and furnish sound
arguments for its abandonment. In this respect, the Article will
rely heavily on the spirit and resourcefulness of the case of United
States v. Toscanino,6 wherein the Second Circuit conducted a
searching examination of the Ker-Frisbie rule and found it unsatis-
of fugitives from other states. North Dakota has adopted its own legislation
to deal with this procedure. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 29-30-01 et seq. (1974).
Extradition from the United States to a foreign nation may only be accom-
plished pursuant to a treaty of extradition. Valentine v. United States ex
rel. Neidecker, 290 U.S. 5, 18 (1936); Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276
(1933); Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540 (1841); Ivancevic v. Artu-
kovic, 211 F.2d 565 (9th Cir. 1954); 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (1948). A list of those
treaties of extradition currently in force between the United States and
other nations can be found at 18 U.S.C.A. § 3181 (1948).
3. See ATToRNEY GEERAjL's FrST A-xuAL REPORT: FEDERAL LAW EN-
FORCEMENT AND CRnVIINAL JusTicE AssIsTANcE AcTIVrTIs 265 (1972). See
also Notes and Comments, 59 Am. J. INT'L L., 351, 357 (1965).
The problem of criminals fleeing to other countries is as old as crime
itself. The Bible relates that after the murder of his brother, Cain fled his
own land. Genesis 4:16. In more modern times, Sir Thomas Henry noted,
before the British House of Commons, the ease with which criminals could
remove themselves to foreign jurisdictions. Proceedings of the Select Com-
mittee of the House of Commons on Extradition, § 331 (1868).
4. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886) and Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S.
519 (1953).
5. By an extra-legal transfer, it is meant that the fugitive is brought
before the court by a means other than extradition under a treaty. These
means may include abduction, deportation or ad hoc bilateral cooperation.
I. SHEARER, EXTRADIfiON IN ImNERATIONAL LAW 72-80 (1971). See also Bas-
siouni, International Extradition in American Practice and World Public
Order, 36 Tm. L. REv. 1, 10 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Bassiouni]; 2
C. HYDE, INEATIONAL LAw 1031-32 (2d ed. 1945); O'Higgins, Disguised
Extradition: The Soblen Case, 27 MOD. L. R-v. 521 (1964).
6. 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).
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factory in light of our current notions of pretrial criminal due
process and international law.
BACKGROUND: THE Ker-Frisbie RULE7
Ker v. Illinoiss was clearly a case of first impression when it
7. The language in the Ker decision which has formed the basis of the
rule is ". . . that forcible abduction is no sufficient reason why the party
should not answer when brought within the jurisdiction of the court which
has the right to try him for the offense . . . ." 119 U.S. at 444. It bears
noting that the Frisbie decision did not enter into a detailed discussion of
the Ker precept. The Court merely intoned the Ker rule and found it rec-
oncilable with the due process clause of the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments.
[D]ue process of law is satisfied when one present before the court
is convicted of crime after having been fairly apprised of the
charges against him and after a fair trial in accordance with consti-
tutional procedural safeguards. 342 U.S. at 522.
The rule has been applied by rote to bar relief to those brought before
a court in derogation of rendition or extradition agreements in nearly all
of the federal circuits and state courts. See Chandler v. United States, 171
F.2d 921 (1st Cir. 1948); United States ex rel. Moore v. Martin, 273 F.2d
344 (2d Cir. 1959); Government of Virgin Islands v. Ortiz, 427 F.2d 1043
(3d Cir. 1970); United States v. Herrera, 504 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1974); United
States ex rel. Calhoun v. Twomey, 454 F.2d 326 (7th Cir. 1971); Bacon v.
United States, 449 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1971); Hobson v. Crouse, 332 F.2d 561
(10th Cir. 1964). And see Ex parte Barker, 87 Ala. 4, 5, 6 So. 7, 8 (1889);
In re Collins, 151 Cal. 340, 347, 90 P. 827, 830 (1907); Williams v. Weber,
1 Cal. App. 191, 195, 28 P. 21, 22 (1891); Hunter v. State, 174 So. 2d 415, 416
(Fla. Sup. Ct. 1965); Lascelles v. State, 90 Ga. 347, 350, 16 S.E. 945, 946
(1892); Ex parte Moyer, 12 Idaho 250, 257, 85 P. 897, 900 (1906); People
v. Berardi, 332 Ill. 295, 298, 163 N.E. 668, 669 (1928); Canler v. State, 232
Ind. 209, 212, 111 N.E.2d 710, 712 (1953); Ex parte Flack, 88 Kan. 616, 628,
129 P. 541, 544 (1913); Roberts v. Commonwealth, 417 S.W.2d 234 (Ky. Sup.
Ct. 1967); State v. Green, 244 La. 80, 90, 150 So. 2d 571, 574 (1963); People
v. Miller, 235 Mich. 340, 341, 209 N.W. 81, 82 (1926); State v. Rigg, 250 Minn.
365, 368, 84 N.W.2d 698, 701 (1957); State v. Patterson, 116 Mo. 505, 515,
22 S.W. 696, 698 (1893); In re Petry, 47 Neb. 130, 132, 66 N.W. 308, 309
(1896); State v. Wise, 58 N.M. 164, 165, 267 P.2d 992, 992 (1954); People
ex rel. Cockran v. Hyatt, 172 N.Y. 176, 181, 64 N.E. 825, 826 (1902); State
v. Glover, 112 N.C. 896, 897, 17 S.E. 525, 526 (1893); State v. Owen, 119
Ore. 20, 25, 244 P. 516, 520 (1926); Commonwealth ex rel. Master v. Boldi,
166 Pa. 413, 421, 72 A.2d 150, 154 (1950); State v. Waiters, 226 S.C. 44, 52,
83 S.E.2d 629, 632 (1954); Ward v. State, 102 Tenn. 724, 727, 52 S.W. 996,
997 (1899); Ex parte Baker, 43 Tex. Crim. 281, 282, 65 S.W. 91 (1901); State
v. Melvern, 32 Wash. 7, -, 72 P. 489, 491 (1903); State v. McAninch, 95 W.
Va. 363, 364, 121 S.E. 161, 162 (1924); Moletor v. Sinned, 76 Wis. 308, 313,
44 N.W. 1099, 1100 (1890); Kingen v. Kelley, 3 Wyo. 570, 577, 28 P. 36, 40
(1891). The most recent application of the Ker-Frisbie rule in California
was in People v. Leary, 40 Cal. App. 3d 527, 115 Cal. Rptr. 85 (1974).
8. 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
reached the Supreme Court in 1886. The only case the Court had
previously considered which bore any resemblance to the issues
placed before it in Ker was The Ship Richmond v. United States.0
In The Richmond, the appellant sought to overturn a judgment of
forfeiture which resulted from the ship's violation of a noninter-
course law.10 The claimants argued that the seizure of the vessel
within the territorial waters of a foreign power, a violation of inter-
national law, should deprive a domestic court of jurisdiction over
the vessel. The Court rejected this contention, viewing the seizure
The case was so begotten as to be almost laughable. Ker was a suspected
embezzler in the state of Illinois. Upon his disappearance, Ker's employers
hired out a Pinkerton agent to apprehend him and recover the cash and
securities Ker had absconded with. A good piece of detective work led the
agent to Lima, Peru where he found Ker in the spring of 1883. At this
time, Peru was at war with Chile and the Chilean forces all but commanded
the entire country. In the meantime, Illinois officials had obtained extradi-
tion papers from the Secretary of State for Ker's arrest in Peru under the
treaty of extradition then in force between the United States and that coun-
try. The extradition papers, which included a warrant for Ker's arrest,
were forwarded to the agent.
Armed with these papers, and unable to contact the last vestiges of the
conquered Peruvian government, the agent contacted the Chilean military
commander. The commander thereupon dispatched one of his officers to
aid the agent in capturing Ker. Upon his capture, Ker was placed on board
a United States warship, then in the harbor of Callao, and thus began his
return to the United States where he would stand trial and be convicted.
Brief for Defendant in Error at 19-21, Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
When his case reached the Supreme Court, Ker's counsel did not argue
that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because Ker had been brought into
this country in derogation of the treaty of extradition. Rather, counsel ar-
gued that by virtue of the treaty of extradition between the United States
and Peru, Ker acquired a "right of asylum" in the foreign country. Brief
for Plaintiff in Error at 20, Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886). Such an
argument was clearly a misconception of recognized concepts of interna-
tional law and the purpose of the treaty. The Supreme Court discussed
this argument, Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. at 442-43, and dismissed it out of
hand as an absurd proposition.
Noting the narrow grounds for review of a state court's decision that the
Court possessed by virtue of § 709 of the Revised Statutes (the present pro-
vision is an expanded version and appears at 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1948)), Jus-
tice Miller, who authored the opinion of the Court, went on, only in dicta,
to announce what has come down to us as the Ker-Frisbie rule.
For an excellent review of the facts and arguments leading up to the
Court's decision, see Comment, Ker v. Illinois Revisited, 47 Am. J. INT'L
L. 678-86 (1953).
9. 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 102 (1815), cited in Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. at
444.
10. Act of March 1, 1809, ch. 24, and Act of June 28, 1809, ch. 9, 2 Stat.
528, 550. These two enactments mandated that United States vessels sailing
for British or French ports must post bond with the United States govern-
ment. The Richmond sailed from Philadelphia and proceeded to Ports-
mouth, England without posting bond. The ship was eventually captured
by a United States gunboat while at anchor in Spanish waters off the Flor-
ida coast.
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as an offense against the foreign nation having no effect on the
power of a domestic court to libel the ship.11 The violation of inter-
national law was something to be adjusted between the respective
governments.
12
By analogy to The Richmond holding, the Court in Ker held that
a defendant whose presence before the court had been obtained in
violation of international law or in derogation of a treaty of extra-
dition could not assert the irregularity as a bar to the court's as-
sumption of jurisdiction.13 This rationale has been stylized by some
as mala captus bene detentus,14 and the best that can be said for
11. 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) at 103. This was merely a precept followed by
the prize-ship courts of the early nineteenth century. As Lord Stowell an-
nounced in The Purissima Conception, 6 C. Rob. 45, 47, 165 Eng. Rep. 844,
845 (1805), "the privilege of territory will not itself enure to the protection
of property, unless the state from which that protection is due steps forward
to assert the right." Accord The Eliza Ann, 1 Dods. 244, 165 Eng. Rep. 1298
(1813); The Twee Gebroeders, 3 C. Rob. 162, 165 Eng. Rep. 422 (1800).
The importance of this pronouncement cannot be overstated. In numer-
ous cases in more recent times, the courts have relied on this precise prin-
ciple in denying relief to criminal defendants who challenge the jurisdiction
of the court subsequent to an extra-legal transfer from a foreign jurisdic-
tion. In United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 Adv. F.2d 62 (2d
Cir. 1975), the court denied relief to a defendant who had been abducted
from Argentina, declaring that, "the failure of Bolivia or Argentina to
object to Lujan's abduction would seem to preclude any violation of inter-
national law which might otherwise have occurred." Accord United States
v. Sobell, 142 F. Supp. 515, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
Whatever pragmatic justification may have been perceived for this pre-
cept during the Napoleanic Wars of the early nineteenth century, there were
some English jurists who were not completely satisfied with its implica-
tions. A notable example of this minority position can be found in the
court's decision in The Anna, 5 C. Rob. 373, 385h, 165 Eng. Rep. 809, 816
(1805), a prize-ship case involving a Spanish vessel seized by an English
privateer in American waters:
Looking to all the circumstances of the previous misconduct, I feel
myself bound to pronounce, that there has been a violation of terri-
tory, and that as to the question of property, there was not suffi-
cient ground for seizure; and that these acts of misconduct have
been further aggravated, by bringing the vessel to England, without
any necessity that can justify such a measure. In such a case it
would be falling short of the justice due to the violated rights of
America, and to the individuals who have sustained injury by such
misconduct, if I did not follow up the restitution... with a decree
of costs and damages. (emphasis added).
12. 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) at 103.
13. 119 U.S. at 444.
14. This phrase simply means that a defective seizure is a good capture.
See Bassiouni, supra note 5, at 12; Cardozo, When Extradition Fails, Is Ab-
duction the Solution?, 55 Am. J. INT'L L. 127, 132 (1961).
the proposition is that it was recognized by the earliest scholars
of international law.' 5 The maxim was, however, not universally
regarded; the prize-ship courts of France, Germany and Italy held
that the capture of a vessel in foreign waters was absolutely illegal
regardless of whether the offended nation asserted a claim.10
In the 1933 case of Cook v. United States,17 the rule announced
in The Richmond and adopted by the Court in Ker was virtually
nullified. Cook involved a seizure and forfeiture of the British ship
Mazel Toy which had been taken by officers of the Coast Guard
at a point eleven and a half miles from the United States' shoreline
for violations of the Prohibition Act.' s The United States had pre-
viously entered into a treaty with Great Britain") which permitted
American authorities to stop and search British vessels within a
prescribed distance from shore.20 The seizure had occurred beyond
the treaty limit. The claimants contended that the seizure was il-
legal as violating the treaty and that the lower court was therefore
without authority to libel the vessel. The Court agreed, viewing
the treaty as a limitation not only on the power to make a seizure,
but also on the jurisdiction of the lower court to adjudge the ship
forfeited without regard to whether the foreign sovereignty ob-
jected.
21
The Court attempted to distinguish its holding in The Richmond
by noting that Cook involved the violation of a treaty, while the
former case merely entailed violations of customary international
15. See generally the court's discussion in Regina v. Lopez, Dears. Bell
525, 531-538, 169 Eng. Rep. 1105, 1108-10 (1858). More recently, the maxim
has come under attack by scholars of international law. See Bassiouni,
supra note 5, at 12; Dickinson, Jurisdiction Following Seizure or Arrest in
Violation of International Law, 28 Am. J. INT'L L. 231, 240 (1934) [herein-
after cited as Dickinson].
16. Dickinson at 240 n.28.
17. 288 U.S. 102 (1933).
18. Id. at 107.
19. Section 581 of the Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356, 42 Stat. 858, 979.
20. The distance set by the treaty was the distance the ship could cover
in one hour's sailing. 288 U.S. at 112.
21. The Treaty fixes the conditions under which a "vessel may be
seized and taken into a port of the United States... in accordance
with" the applicable laws .... Our government, lacking power to
seize, lacked power, because of the Treaty, to subject the vessel to
our laws. 288 U.S. at 121.
In a similar case, Ford v. United States, the Court strongly suggested that
violation of a treaty regarding the seizure of vessels and arrest of crewmen
for smuggling violations might well deprive the court of jurisdiction. 273
U.S. 593, 606 (1926). Such a result was reached by the United States
district courts in United States v. Ferris, 19 F.2d 925, 926 (N.D. Cal. 1927),
and United States v. Schouweiler, 19 F.2d 387, 387 (S.D. Cal. 1927).
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law. 22 But this distinction was clearly without merit. As Professor
Dickinson noted, "seizures in violation of accepted principles of in-
ternational law are certainly as thoroughly contaminated with il-
legality as a seizure in violation of a treaty. '2 3 The Court's high
regard for positive international law in Cook is remarkable in light
of its earlier pronouncement in The Paquette Habana:
24
International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and
administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as
often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented
for their determination. For this purpose, where there is no treaty,
and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision,
resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations.2 5
To reconcile the holding in The Richmond and the reasoning of
Ker with the subsequent pronouncements and refinements in Cook
and The Paquette Habana is quite difficult. Even more alarming
is that the Court had the opportunity to renounce the Ker rule
in Frisbie v. Collins in 1953, but chose to revitalize the assuredly
outmoded concept. Still more curious than the Court's attempt to
distinguish the Richmond-Ker reasoning in the Cook decision, is
that Ker, in fact, presented a case where a treaty, albeit not tech-
nically violated, was ignored.
The same day the Court rejected Ker's contention, it handed down
United States v. Rauscher.20 Rauscher, indicted by a United States
grand jury for murder on the high seas, was extradited from
England in full compliance with the existing treaty of extradition
between the United States and Great Britain. However, once the
defendant was before the court a different offense was charged
against him.
2 7
Rauscher challenged the jurisdiction of the court to try him on
this different offense, invoking what has come to be known as the
22. 288 U.S. at 122. The Court concluded that the violation of a treaty
was '"more fundamental" than a violation of the law of nations.
23. Dickinson, supra note 15, at 241. See also M. BASSIOUNI, INTERNA-
TiONAL EXTRADrIION AD WoRLD PuBLic ORDE 152 (1974).
24. 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
25. 175 U.S. at 700. The Court directly referred to the comment of Lord
Stowell, supra note 11, and found it unsatisfactory in light of more modern
concepts of international law. 175 U.S. at 705.
26. 119 U.S. 407 (1886).
27. 119 U.S. at 410.
doctrine of specialty.28 Rauscher maintained that the court's juris-
diction was limited by treaty to trying him on the offense which
was set forth in the extradition request. The Court agreed with
Rauscher, holding that the treaty of extradition bestowed certain
personal rights on the defendant 20 which would bar his prosecution
for crimes other than those upon which he had been extradicted. 80
The Court went beyond this narrow holding, however, and in the
following language described the true nature and effect the courts
were bound to give a treaty of extradition.
[A]s this right of transfer, the right to demand it, the obligation
to grant it, the proceedings under which it takes place, all show
it is for a limited and defined purpose that the transfer is made,
it is impossible to conceive of the exercise of jurisdiction in such
a case for any other purpose than that mentioned in the treaty, and
ascertained by the proceedings under which the party is extradited,
without an implication of fraud upon the rights of the party extra-
dited, and of bad faith to the country which permitted his extra-
dition. No such view of solemn treaties between the great nations
of the earth can be sustained by a tribunal called upon to give
judicial construction to them.3 1
That the national courts are bound to limit their jurisdiction in
accordance with the prescriptions of the treaties of extradition
which bring the defendants before them is inapposite with the Ker
holding that a court enjoys plenary jurisdiction when the treaty
is wholly ignored. Ker and Rauscher read together leave an incon-
gruent result that limits the jurisdiction of one court where a prop-
erly extradited defendant stands before it, yet fails to place any
rein on the power of a court which has assumed jurisdiction in
complete derogation of a treaty of extradition.
28. See Bassiouni, supra note 5, at 15; 2 C. HYDE, INTMMATIONAL LAW
1034 (2d ed. 1945). See, e.g., Johnson v. Browne, 205 U.S. 309 (1907); Cos-
grove v. Winney, 174 U.S. 64 (1899).
29. Of extreme importance is that the Court noted that treaties between
nations more than regulated the rights and relations of the contracting sov-
ereigns, and in fact granted certain personal rights to the citizens of the
contracting nations. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 418-19, quoting
the following language from the Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598
(1884):
A treaty is primarily a compact between independent nations. It
depends for the enforcement of its provisions on the interest and
honor of the governments which are parties to it .... But a treaty
may also contain provisions which confer certain rights upon the
citizens in the territorial limits of the other ....
See also Sponsler, International Kidnapping, 5 INT'L LAw. 27, 33 (1971).
30. 119 U.S. at 419.
As Professor Dickinson aptly characterized the Rauscher mandate,
"while it is concluded that the individual, as such, has no right of asylum
in the foreign state, his objection to the jurisdiction [based on the different
charge] serves as a foil to remind the court of the nation's international
obligation." Dickinson, supra note 15, at 232.
31. 119 U.S. at 422.
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The full impact of the Rauscher-Ker anomaly is highlighted when
another element is considered. A fundamental principle of inter-
national law is that the sovereignty of every nation is limited by
its own territorial boundaries, and any nation is therefore in-
competent to act within the territorial boundaries of another sov-
ereign without its consent.32 Then Secretary of State James Mon-
roe wrote the following in a letter dated December 6, 1815:
No principle is better established than that no government has a
right to pursue offenders against its laws ... into the dominions
of another: that such persons can be recovered by application only
to the government within whose jurisdiction they take shelter, and
in obedience to its laws and treaties applicable to such a case. A
departure from this principle being a violation of sovereignty, sel-
dom fails to produce disagreeable consequences. 33
This precept makes the Court's position in Ker, that since no
treaty was invoked, no treaty was involved in the case, an unreal-
istic view. A treaty of extradition is an agreement permitting a
sovereign to obtain a fugitive found in another's jurisdiction. As
Rauscher explained, the treaty sets the parameters for the exercise
of jurisdiction over the defendant.34 Complete disregard of the
treaty seems no less a valid basis for challenging the jurisdiction
of a court, than if a particular provision of a treaty is violated or
ignored. A proceeding which brings the defendant before the court
in derogation of the treaty should be, in view of the Rauscher hold-
ing, a violation of the treaty.
35
32. Now the first and foremost restriction imposed by international
law upon a State is that failing the existence of a permissive rule
to the contrary, it may not exercise its power in any form in the
territory of another State. In this sense, jurisdiction is certainly
territorial; it cannot be exercised by a State outside its territory
except by virtue of a permissive rule derived from international
custom or from a convention. The S.S. Lotus, Permanent Court of
International Justice, Series A, No. 10, at 18 (1927).
33. Letter from Mr. Monroe, Secretary of State, to Mr. Anthony St. John
Baker, December 6, 1815, reported in 2 J. MooRE, IN'EwATioNAL LAw Di-
GEST 362 (1906).
34. 119 U.S. at 422.
35. This premise, however, does raise a classic justiciability problem-
standing. A threshold barrier to any claim for relief based on an extra-
legal transfer would depend on whether the defendant could raise the treaty
as a bar to the exercise of jurisdiction. Some have suggested that the stand-
ing issue is dependent on whether the treaty creates certain rights inuring
to the defendant. In this respect, the treaty, or a provision of the treaty,
must be found to be self-executing. See generally Dickinson, Are the
Liquor Treaties Self-Executing?, 20 Am. J. INT'L L. 444 (1926); Evans, The
The force of the Rauscher mandate clearly exposes the Ker rule
to attack upon the reasoning advanced in the Cook case. As Cook
found the power to seize arose under a treaty, so too did Rauscher
make it clear that the ability to obtain fugitives from foreign juris-
dictions arises solely by the grace of treaties of extradition. When
a power granted by a treaty is exercised in a manner ignoring the
restrictions of the agreement, then the sovereign is acting outside
of its competent authority, and cannot assert jurisdiction based
upon this action.3 6 As the Court explained in The Schooner Ex-
change v. McFaddon,37 the jurisdiction of a court is "a branch of
that which is possessed by the nation as a sovereign entity." "If
there is no national competence, obviously there can be no compe-
tence in the courts which are only a branch of the national power.1
8
8
Self-Executing Treaty in Contemporary American Practice, in DE LEGE PAC-
TORUm 3 (D. Deneer ed. 1970).
In both Cook and Rauscher the Court found provisions of the respective
treaties to be self-executing, and therefore could be raised as a bar to the
court's jurisdiction. Accord Gino. Niehaus v. United States, 373 F.2d 944,
957 (Ct. Cl. 1967); Hannevig v. United States, 84 F. Supp. 743 (Ct. Cl. 1949).
Contra Komlos v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 111 F. Supp. 393
(S.D.N.Y. 1952), rev'd, 209 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
820 (1954).
The question of the self-executing nature of a treaty or treaty provision
is one of judicial determination. Evans, supra at 18, suggests that the fol-
lowing criteria enter into a court's decision on this issue:
[T]he text of the treaty itself, the intent of the parties, the circum-
stances surrounding the conclusion of the treaty, considerations of
the internal law of the parties, the climate of political opinion at
the time the treaty is concluded, ratified, or submitted to judicial
interpretation, and the circumstances in which the litigants seek to
apply the treaty at issue ....
Dickinson, supra at 445, also suggests that the intention of the parties is
particularly relevant to this inquiry. See, e.g., the Court's discussion in
United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 415-417 (1886).
Focusing on the intentions of the parties, it seems clear that at least one
of the purposes for the execution of an extradition treaty is to regulate and
formalize the manner in which fugitives are obtained out of the signatories
own jurisdiction. As noted supra note 2, a fugitive may not be removed
from the United States in the absence of an extradition treaty. See Valen-
tine v. United States ex Tel. Neidecker, 290 U.S. 5, 18 (1936). The same
intention has also been evidenced by foreign governments. See M.
BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL ExTRAD~Iox Am WORLD PuBLic ORDER 174-75
(1974). See also C. PARRY, 5 BRITISH DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 1860-
1914 480-83 (1965). In September 1974, Canadian officials demanded the
return of a United States deserter who was seized by U.S. agents just fifty
yards inside Canada after a hot pursuit that began in the United States.
The Rauscher Court concluded that the defendant could raise the treaty's
enumeration of extraditable offenses as a bar to the court's jurisdiction in
order to effect the intention of the parties. An analogous argument could
be made that a treaty of extradition is self-executing to the extent that it
bars the exercise of jurisdiction subsequent to an extra-legal transfer.
36. See 288 U.S. at 121.
37. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812).
38. Dickinson, supra note 15, at 231.
[voL. 12: 865, 1975J Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
As Cook and Rauscher illustrate, the competency of the court is
subject to attack by the defendant notwithstanding the failure of
the offended nation to lodge a protest-an action the Ker Court
considered as a condition precedent to any objection to the jurisdic-
tion of the court. The mere existence of the treaty clothes the de-
fendant with certain rights which he may assert as a bar to the
assumption of jurisdiction.39  Thus, a treaty if violated or dis-
regarded should have the effect of rendering the court's jurisdiction
a nullity ab initio.40
Going then to the roots of the decision in Ker v. Illinois4 1 there
is little to recommend the continuing vitality of the rule. The cases
cited as precedent by the Court in Ker42 possess slight persuasive
value in light of legal theory which has developed well beyond their
"prize-ship court" mentality. The anomaly is that the Ker precept
has withstood the tide of progress. The result reached in Ker is
clearly unsatisfactory in the wake of the high Court's more en-
lightened view of the law of nations,43 and in practice sanctions
governmental activity that violates both positive and customary in-
ternational law. 44 Still the rule laid down nearly ninety years ago,
39. See notes 29 & 35 supra.
40. See text accompanying note 21 supra.
41. 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
42. The Ship Richmond v. United States, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 102 (1815);
State v. Ross and Mann, 21 Iowa 467 (1866); Dowe's Case, 18 Pa. 37 (1851);
State v. Smith, 1 Bailey, So. Car. Law, 283, 8 S.C. 131 (1829); State v: Brew-
ster, 7 Vt. 118 (1855); Regina v. Lopez Dears. Bell 525, 169 Eng.
Rep. 1105 (1858); Ex parte Scott, 9 B.C. 449, 109 Eng. Rep. 167 (1829).
43. Scholars of international law have roundly criticized the Ker holding,
finding it completely incompatible with modern concepts of international
law and the ordered relations among nations. See, e.g., Bassiouni, supra
note 5, at 10; Dickinson, supra note 15, at 234; Garcia-Mora, Criminal Juris-
diction of a State over Fugitives Brought from a Foreign Country by Force
or Fraud: A Comparative Study, 32 IND. L.J. 427, 429 (1957); I. SHEARER,
EXTRADiTiON IN, INTRNATiONAL LAw 72 (1971).
44. U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 4 provides:
All members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat of use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state....
The international repercussions that such extra-legal transfers of fugitives
can invoke was amply illustrated in the abduction of Adolf Eichmann from
Argentina by Israeli agents. See Cutler, The Eichmann Trial, 4 CAN. B.J.
352 (1961); Sponsler, International Kidnapping, 5 INT'L LAw. 27, 46 (1971).
and more recently affirmed in Frisbie v. Collins,45 enjoys continued
vitality.46
United States v. Toscanino: A BRoAD ATrACK4 7
Even as the Ker-Frisbie rule lives on in the face of continued
criticism by members of the international legal fraternity, 48 its
reign as an absolute rule of law has been, at best, a dubious one.
40
Although no case has decidedly rejected the Ker holding, the rule
has lately been the subject of criticism by a number of courts.
In United States v. Edmons ° the Second Circuit suggested what
may be considered the most persuasive argument against the Ker-
Frisbie rule. The court was confronted with an illustration of the
more loathsome aspects of unbridled police authority.51 The appel-
lants argued that their brutal and unwarranted arrests should de-
prive the court of the opportunity to proceed against them. The
appellate court agreed with the claimants that the trial court "could
not simply look the other way" 52 in the face of such patently illegal
conduct by the police. In reaching this decision the Second Circuit
took this view of the Kei2-Frisbie rule:
We do not find Frisbie... and its predecessors going back to Ker
v. Illinois... to be a truly persuasive analogy. These cases were
decided before the Fourth Amendment as such was held applicable
to the states .. . and thus rested only on general considerations
of due process .... Whether the Court would now adhere to them
must be regarded as questionable. 3
45. 342 U.S. 519 (1953).
46. See United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 Adv. F.2d 62 (1975);
United States v. Herrera, 504 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1974); People v. Leary, 40
Cal. App. 3d 527, 115 Cal. Rptr. 85 (1974).
47. 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).
48. See 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812). See generally Preuss, Kid-
napping of Fugitives from Justice on Foreign Territory, 29 Am. J. INT'L L.
502 (1935); Sponsler, International Kidnapping, 5 INT'L LAw. 27, 45-46
(1971).
49. In the following ases the courts were confronted with issues which
were amenable to swift solution via application of the Ker pronouncement.
In each case, however, the court chose to circumvent the rule and held that
the case at bar was distinguishable. Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102
(1933); Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593 (1927); United States v. Ferris,
19 F.2d 925 (N.D. Cal. 1927); United States v. Schouweiler, 19 F.2d 387 (S.D.
Cal. 1927).
50. 432 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1970).
51. The course of the arrests that led up to the Edmvns case was, as the
court stated, "dramatic." United States v. Edmons, 432 F.2d at 579. The
day after an angry mob had violently deprived four F.B.I. agents of the
fruit of an arrest, fifty to sixty agents were called together to launch an
assault on a Brooklyn address. The ensuing strike netted the agents five
suspects all of whom were arrested for failure to have Selective Service
cards in their possession. Id. at 580-81.
52. United States v. Edmons, 432 F.2d at 585.
53. Id. at 583 [footnote & citation omitted].
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The Edmons court thereby suggested what would become in Tos-
canino one of the chief bases for an attack on the Ker-Frisbie rule:
the Warren era development of pretrial criminal due process under
the fourth, fifth, sixth and fourteenth amendments. 54 This devel-
opment cast grave doubt upon the Frisbie pronouncement that "due
process of law is satisfied when one present before the court is con-
victed of crime after having been fairly apprised of the charges
against him and after a fair trial in accordance with constitutional
procedural safeguards."' 5
Within a month of Edmons, the Third Circuit decided the case
of Government of the Virgin Islands v. Ortiz,56 wherein the defend-
ant challenged the jurisdiction of the trial court subsequent to an
extra-legal transfer from the Territory of Puerto Rico. While the
appellate court, citing Ker and Frisbie, inter alia, was unable to
find a violation of a constitutional guarantee in the manner of Or-
tiz's transfer, it did note "that the validity of the Frisbie doctrine
has been seriously questioned because it condones illegal police con-
duct."57  Finally, in United States v. Cotten5s the Ninth Circuit
joined the ranks of those passive dissenters who criticized the rule
but refused to withhold jurisdiction. In Cotten the defendants had
been transported from the Republic of Vietnam to Hawaii without
the benefit of a proper extradition proceeding and raised this dep-
rivation as a bar to the district court's jurisdiction. 59 Although
the language of the decision evidences some agonizing on the part
of its author, 0 the court still refused to ignore the Ker-Frisbie prec-
54. See generally Pitler, "The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree" Revisited and
Shepardized, 56 CALU'. L. Rsv. 579 (1968).
55. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. at 522.
56. 427 F.2d 1043 (3d Cir. 1970).
57. Id. at 1045 n.2.
The court cited to Allen, Due Process and State Criminal Procedures:
Another Look, 48 Nw. U.L. REv. 16 (1953); Pitler, "The Fruit of the Poison-
ous Tree" Revisited and Shepardized, 56 CALIF. L. Rnv. 579 (1968); The Su-
preme Court, 1951 Term, 66 HARv. L. REv. 89, 127 (1952).
58. 471 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1973).
59. Id. at 748.
60. The Supreme Court has not since abandoned the Ker principle,
and it has been widely reasserted, though at times critically, by the
Circuits. The fact that it was state court jurisdiction that was
questioned in the early cases which established the rule is unim-
portant. The protection sought in the cases enunciating the prin-
ciple was that of the Federal Constitution. The Supreme Court
found that none was afforded then; we are unable to find any
now. (footnotes omitted). Id.
edent. Echoing the Ortiz court, however, the Cotten panel did state
its concern over the incongruous results the Ker-Frisbie rule
worked in the modern structure of criminal due process.
While the court recognizes that the vitality of the doctrine we fol-
low may be in doubt, and that federal officers might be held to
a higher standard of conduct than their state counterparts, we will
not strike it down. Recent legislation and constitutional protec-
tions enunciated in the last decade provide viable alternative means
of coping with undisciplined law enforcement activities.0 '
While this evidence of discontent with the Ker-Frisbie rule may
have been the harbinger of a shift to a more enlightened and de-
fensible position, few could have predicted the massive, broad-based
assault on the rule advanced in United States v. Toscanino.02 All
the more ironic is that the breakthrough would occur in a case that
engendered no high-pitched publicity.0 3
61. Id.
The remarkable aspect of this suggestion is that unlike the brutal and
unreasonable conduct of the officers in Edmons, the Cotten defendants' sole
challenge to the officers' activities went to their failure to abide by proper
extradition procedure. The court indicated the failure to undertake proper
extradition may in itself be the subject of due process scrutiny. In Tosca-
nino the Ninth Circuit's prophesy was realized.
62. 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).
The three-judge panel which sat on Toscanino's appeal was composed of
Circuit Judges Anderson, Mansfield and Oakes. Judge Mansfield authored
the opinion of the court which was a unanimous ruling. Although concur-
ring in the court's decision, Judge Anderson filed a separate opinion ex-
pressing his belief that the result could have been the same without calling
into question the Ker-Frisbie rule. Judge Anderson felt that the irregular
activities of the federal agents which led up to Toscanino's presence before
the court would bar the assumption of jurisdiction citing Rochin v. Califor-
nia, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) and United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670 (2d Cir.
1973). Relying on the reasoning in United States v. Sobell, 142 F. Supp.
515 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), Judge Anderson concluded that Toscanino could not
assert a treaty violation as a bar to jurisdiction since the treaty was not
invoked to obtain the defendant's presence. Clearly, Judge Anderson was
not prepared to rebuke the Ker-Frisbie rule. United States v. Toscanino,
500 F.2d at 281-82. And see United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510
Adv. F.2d 62 (1975) (Anderson, J., concurring).
Ivan S. Fisher of New York City represented Toscanino on appeal. In
a telephone conversation with Mr. Fisher the writer learned that Mr. Fisher
was more than mildly surprised by the court's attack on the Ker-Frisbie
rule. Although he argued for the rule's demise, see Brief for Appellant at
24-43, United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974), Toscanino's
counsel foresaw the Rochin violation as the primary basis for challenging
the jurisdiction of the district court, id. at 9-23.
63. The first ray of publicity enjoyed by the Toscanino case came in
Tn=M, December 2, 1974, at 63:
Barely one week after the toppling of Salvador Allende's regime
last year, Chilean authorities set about arresting drug smugglers.
During the Allende years, according to Interpol, Chile had played
host to the world's largest cocaine-trafficking operation, and the
U.S., which was at the receiving end of the line, was not at all
happy. The new junta and American narcs quickly worked out a
cozy arrangement. Five federal drug agents flew to Chile to finger
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Francisco Toscanino, a native of Italy, was a resident of Monte-
video, Uruguay. Toscanino was lured from his home by a paid
agent of the United States Government. Once in a remote area
of Montevideo, Toscanino was abducted by the agent and six other
men who shuttled him across the border into Brazil where he was
handed over to a group of Brazilians. Toscanino was eventually
taken to Brasilia where he was held incommunicado for seventeen
days. During this period Toscanino was subjected to brutal torture
and interrogations, some conducted by agents of the Bureau of Nar-
cotics and Dangerous Drugs. The United States Attorney for the
Eastern District of New York received daily reports on the progress
of this "investigation." Finally, Toscanino was conducted to Rio de
Janiero where he was drugged and put on an American Airlines
jet. He awoke in New York in the custody of a United States
marshal.64
Toscanino was tried in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York together with three co-defendants.
The jury returned a verdict of guilty to a charge involving con-
spiracy to import narcotics.65 Toscanino's motion to vacate the ver-
dict, dismiss the indictment and return him to Uruguay was denied
by the district court.66
smugglers. Chilean police arrested and eventually expelled the
suspects on a non-stop flight to the U.S.-often after days of torture
to check on any possible anti-junta activities. The arrangement is
still in effect, to the dismay of at least 16 Chileans who are cur-
rently being tried, one by one, in federal courts.
American Courts have traditionally held that the manner in which
a defendant is brought to the U.S. does not affect the court's power
to try him. In the leading case on the subject, the Supreme Court
in 1886 upheld the conviction of an Illinois embezzler whowas
grabbed and brought back from South America by a Pinkerton de-
tective [Ker]. There has been a recent dent in that precedent,
however. The U.S. Second Circuit Court of Appeals, which has a
jurisdiction that includes New York, ruled last May that due proc-
ess now requires a court to divest itself of jurisdiction over ...
a defendant, where it has been acquired as the result of the govern-
ment's deliberate, unnecessary and unreasonable invasion of the ac-
cused's constitutional rights [Toscanino].
64. This entire episode was alleged by Toscanino in the district court
upon his motion to dismiss the proceedings. The lower court saw no legal
merit in Toscanino'i claim and denied his motion without a hearing. The
court of appeals therefore accepted Toscanino's allegations as true for the
purpose of appeal. United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 269-71.
65. 21 U.S.C. §§ 173-74 (1956), which are now embodied in 21 U.S.C.
§ 963.
66. United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 270-71.
On appeal, the Second Circuit set the issue for decision in this
manner:
EW] e face the question of ... whether a federal court must assume
jurisdiction over the person of a defendant who is illegally appre-
hended abroad and forcibly abducted by government agents to the
United States for the purpose of facing criminal charges here. The
answer necessitates a review and appraisal of two Supreme Court
decisions, heavily relied upon by the government and by the dis-
trict court, Ker v. Illinois and Frisbie v. Collins.67
The court reviewed the decisions in Ker and Frisbie and con-
cluded that those cases stood for the proposition that "[j] urisdiction
gained through an indisputably illegal act might still be exercised
.... ,,68 Alluding to the Edmons view that modern due process
interpretations had expanded the scope of judicial scrutiny into the
area of pretrial procedures, 69 the court found that the Frisbie dec-
laration70 could no longer be given the effect of barring an inquiry
into the manner in which a defendant is brought before the court.
71
If the decision had gone no farther than to declare that a court
could indeed inquire into the facts leading up to its assumption of
jurisdiction over the person of a criminal defendant, it would have
been a landmark pronouncement.
72
Toscanino also appealed upon a denial of his motion to suppress the fruits
on an allegedly unlawful wiretap conducted in Uruguay. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 2510 (1968). The circuit court also found merit in this assignment of error.
500 F.2d at 270-71.
67. 500 F.2d at 273 (citations omitted).
68. Id.
69. See Griswold, The Due Process Revolution and Confrontation, 119 U.
P.a. L. -REv. 711 (1971).
70. See the discussion of Frisbie v. Collins in the text accompanying note
55 supra.
71. In this respect the court entered into a detailed analysis of Rochin
v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). Rochin, as the court read it, expanded
the concept of due process to the extent that all government activity sur-
rounding a criminal prosecution was subject to review to determine whether
challenged government methods and activities had offended a "sense of jus-
tice" (Id. at 173). United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 274. Accord,
United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670 (2d Cir. 1973).
72. Compare this conclusion in Toscanino with Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S.
519 (1953); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886); United States v. Cotten,
471 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1973); United States ex rel. Moore v. Martin, 273
F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1959); United States v. Sobell, 244 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1957);
Gillars v. United States, 182 F.2d 962 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Chandler v. United
States, 171 F.2d 921 (1st Cir. 1949); Sheehan v. Huff, 142 F.2d 81 (D.C. Cir.
1944), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 764 (1944); Fiocconi v. Attorney General of
the United States, 339 F. Supp. 1242 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); United States v. Insull,
8 F. Supp. 310 (E.D. Ill. 1934); Ex parte Lopez, 6 F. Supp. 342 (S.D. Tex.
1934); and United States v. Unverzagt, 299 F. 1015 (W.D. Wash. 1924), for
the proposition that personal jurisdiction of a court to proceed against a
defendant present before the court will not be inquired into.
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Having concluded that modern concepts of due process may com-
pel a court to examine the manner in which the defendant was
brought into the jurisdiction of the tribunal, the Toscanino court
considered the nature of a due process violation that might divest
a court of jurisdiction. While not entirely explicit in the decision,
Toscanino does suggest two separate bases upon which a due process
violation could lead a court to withhold its jurisdiction.
The first ground advanced by the court was based upon the now
classic Rochin edict that due process of law will not permit a court
to tolerate government conduct that "shocks the conscience. ' 73 The
Toscanino court had little trouble concluding that the horror story
incidents related by the defendant regarding his abduction, torture
and eventual transfer to the United States were precisely the type
of outrageous government behavior that would bar the prosecution
from invoking the judicial process.
74
The second basis proposed in the decision, suggested by United
States v. Russell,75 was that due process would call for a court to
withhold its jurisdiction "where it resulted from flagrantly illegal
law enforcement practices. '76 The court drew support for the es-
73. United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 274.
Regard for the requirements of the Due Process Clause inescapably
imposes upon this Court an exercise of judgment over the whole
course of the proceedings in order to ascertain whether they offend
those canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of
justice of English speaking people....
Applying these general considerations to the circumstances of the
present case, we are compelled to conclude that the proceedings
by which this conviction was obtained do more than offend some
fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism about combat-
ting crime too categorically. This is conduct that shocks the con-
science.... 500 F.2d at 274, quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S.
169, 172-73 (1952).
74. Accord, United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
75. 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
The defendants in the Russell case were convicted in federal court for
illegally manufacturing a controlled substance ("speed"). Unfortunately
for the defendants, the supplier of the formula's essential ingredient was
a federal narcotics agent. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority (in-
cluding the Chief Justice and Justices Blackmun, Powell and White), did
not find this conduct sufficiently reprehensible to overturn the defendant's
convictions. But see the dissenting opinions of Justices Stewart and Doug-
las, 411 U.S. at 434.
76. 500 F.2d at 274.
tablishment of this test by referring to United States v. Edmons"
and Government of the Virgin Islands v. Ortiz.
78
This second basis was reached by the Toscanino court upon an
analysis of outstanding international law and our courts' interpreta-
tion of that law.79 The court turned to the law of nations to find
support for the appellant's contention8 0 that his presence before the
court had in fact been the result of flagrantly illegal law enforce-
ment practices.81 Citing to the charters of the United Nations8 2
and the Organization of American States,83 the Toscanino court con-
cluded that the defendant's presence had been obtained as a result
of illegal activity in violation of international law.8 4 This conduct
was found to be flagrant and unreasonable in that,
[h]ere, in contrast, not only were several laws allegedly broken
and crimes committed at the behest of government agents but the
conduct was apparently unnecessary, as the extradition treaty be-
tween the United States and Uruguay ... does not specifically ex-
77. 432 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1970).
78. 457 F.2d 1043 (3d Cir. 1970). See text accompanying notes 50 & 56
supra.
79. See text accompanying notes 17-40 supra.
80. Brief for Appellant at 24-43, United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267
(2d Cir. 1974).
81. It is fairly clear that the court intended to distinguish between the
Rochin ("shocking to the conscience") and Russell ("flagrantly illegal law
enforcement") criteria for finding a due process violation. While the
Rochin standard invokes an appeal to human sensibilities, the Russell test
suggests that strictly legal shortcomings in the pretrial procedures may be
the basis for dismissal. This distinction is crucial because many cases will
involve no opprobrious conduct within the contemplation of Rochin, but the
record may be rife with illegal or extra-legal activity which resulted in the
court obtaining jurisdiction. Compare the factual background of Toscanino,
as an example of a Rochin violation, with the facts in Ker v. Illinois, 119
U.S. 435 (1886), see note 8 supra, as an example of a Russell violation.
82. 500 F.2d at 276-77.
U.N. CHART, art. 2, para. 4 provides:
All members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state....
83. 500 F.2d at 576-77. O.A.S. CHARTER, art. 5, para. 1 provides:
The American states reaffirm the following principles:
a) International law is the standard of conduct of States in
their reciprocal relations:
b) International order consists essentially of respect for the
personality, sovereignty and independence of States, and the
faithful fulfillment of obligations derived from treaties....
84. 500 F.2d at 276.
Deliberate misconduct on the part of United States agents, in vio-
lation not only of constitutional prohibitions [suggesting, perhaps,
the Rochin violation], but also ... of two international treaties ob-
ligating the United States government to respect the territorial sov-
ereignty of Uruguay is charged .... The conduct alleged here sat-
isfies those tests articulated by the Supreme Court in United States
v. Russell (citation omitted) .... Id.
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clude narcotics violations so that a representative of our govern-
ment might have been able to conclude with Uruguay a special ar-
rangement for Toscanino's extradition.8 5
Although the court was unable to find that Toscanino's transfer
without proper extradition proceedings8 6 did not, in and of itself,
violate international law as suggested by the Rauscher decision,8 7
the court did give a "back door" effect to the treaty in finding that
the governmental activity completely disregarding the treaty was
so unreasonable as to amount to a due process violation that would
call for the court to withhold the exercise of jurisdiction.88 In re-
gard to the violation of international law, the court summarized
its stand as follows:
[W]e think a federal court's criminal process is abused or degraded
where it is executed against a defendant who has been brought into
the territory of the United States by the methods alleged here. We
could not tolerate such an abuse without debasing 'the processes
of justice.'8 9
85. 500 F.2d at 276 (citation omitted).
86. As previously noted, an international transfer without proper extradi-
tion proceedings is an extra-legal action. See note 5 supra.
87. See text accompanying notes 34 & 35 supra.
88. The court stated its conclusion as follows:
Faced with a conflict between the two concepts of due process, the
one being the restricted version found in Ker-Frisbie and the other
the expanded and enlightened interpretation expressed in more re-
cent decisions of the Supreme Court, we are persuaded that to the
extent that the two are in conflict, the Ker-Frisbie version must
yield. Accordingly we view due process aq now requiring a court
to divest itself of jurisdiction over the person of a defendant where
it has been acquired as the result of the government's deliberate,
unnecessary and unreasonable invasion of the accused's constitu-
tional rights. United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 275.
Although the court phrased the defect in the district court's proceedings
in terms of personal jurisdiction, there was no suggestion in the decision
that the court had accepted Professor Dickinson's argument that the court's
jurisdiction was defective because there was no national competence in the
United States Government to assert its jurisdiction over Tdscanino. See
Dickinson, supra note 15, at 244. This alternative was nevertheless pre-
sented to the court. See Brief for Appellant at 28, United States v. Tosca-
nino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974). Accord Cook v. United States, 288 U.S.
102 (1933).
89. 500 F.2d at 276 (citation & footnote omitted).
At the conclusion of the language quoted in the text, the court included
a footnote and therein cited to United States v. Cotten, 471 F.2d 744 (9th
Cir. 1973). The court noted Cotten's adherence to the Ker-Frisbie rule, but
distinguished Cotten on the basis that no treaty existed in the case, and
in that case, the defendants had been voluntarily handed over to U.S. offi-
cials by the Vietnamese Government. Id. at 276-77 n.6.
In concluding that an unnecessary violation of international law
might be a basis for a court to divest itself of jurisdiction, the Tos-
canino decision finally answered those critics who had for years
decried the Ker-Frisbie rule.90 Nevertheless, this pronouncement
was short-lived. On January 8, 1975, the decision in United States
ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler91 was handed down within the Second Cir-
cuit. The panel which sat on Lujan's appeal was composed of Cir-
cuit Judges Anderson and Oakes, who sat on the Toscanino panel,
and Chief Judge Irving Kaufman, who nearly nine years earlier,
authored the opinion in United States v. Sobel192 while serving as
a federal district court judge. The only essential difference be-
tween Lujan's case and Toscanino's was that Lujan had suffered
none of the torture and brutality that Toscanino had undergone
subsequent to his abduction.93
Chief Judge Kaufman, who authored the opinion of the court,
concurred in the Toscanino holding that modern conceptions of pre-
trial criminal due process no longer permitted a court to blind itself
to the facts surrounding the manner in which the court obtains
jurisdiction over a criminal defendant.
Yet in recognizing that Ker and Frisbie no longer provided a carte
blanche to government agents bringing defendants from abroad to
the United States by the use of torture, brutality and other such
outrageous conduct, we did not intend to suggest that any irreg-
ularity in the circumstances of a defendant's arrival in the jurisdic-
tion would vitiate the proceedings of the criminal court. In holding
that Ker and Frisbie must yield to the extent they are inconsistent
with the Supreme Court's more recent pronouncements, we scarcely
could have meant to eviscerate the Ker-Frisbie rule, which the Su-
preme Court has never felt impelled to disavow.94
90. See note 40 supra; Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1953).
91. 510 Adv. F.2d 62 (1975).
92. 142 F. Supp. 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
In a lengthy decision, Judge Kaufman rejected a challenge to his own
court's jurisdiction by a defendant who had been abducted from Mexico.
Kaufman hinged his decision on Ker and Frisbie. His honor's opinion re-
garding the merit of Sobell's claim is perhaps best reflected in this passage:
justice... is due also to the Court which in its role of defender
of justice must conscientiously wade through voluminous briefs, af-
fidavits and cited materials seeking merit in a contention so devoid
in legal basis as to make its presentation tantamount to an abuse
of process. Id. at 522.
93. The- defendant, Lujan, was allegedly involved in the same narcotics
smuggling conpiracy that had brought Toscanino before the district court.
Lujan, a resident of Argentina and a licensed pilot, was hired by a paid
operative of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs operat-
ing in South America to fly him to Bolivia. Upon landing in that country,
Bolivian police, acting solely as paid agents of the U.S. officers, took Lujan
into custody. The following day, these Bolivian police placed Lujan on
board a plane destined for New York where he was arrested. Lujan was
tried and convicted in the district court that passed judgment on Toscanino.
94. 510 Adv. F.2d 62 (1975).
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The Lujan opinion concluded that Toscanino was based solely on
the cruel and outrageous behavior of United States officers and
their agents during the seventeen days that Toscanino was held in
Brasilia. The court reasoned that this Rochin violation was the
only conceivable basis upon which to justify the outcome of the
Toscanino court in ordering that the defendant's case be dis-
missed for lack of personal jurisdiction. However, this conclusion
is not supported by a reading of the Toscanino decision. Specifi-
cally, the Toscanino court noted the substantially different outlook
taken by the various courts in the Cook, Ford, Ferris and Schou-
weiler cases9" and concluded that "Ker does not apply where a de-
fendant has been brought into the district court's jurisdiction by
forcible abduction in violation of a treaty."
96
Clearly, Toscanino was decided on more than the Rochin viola-
tion. The court discussed at length the implications of both positive
and customary international law on a court's jurisdiction when a
criminal defendant's presence is secured in violation of those laws.
Further, the Lujan explanation that Toscanino was decided solely
on the basis of the brutality of the defendant's incarceration in
Brazil, ignores a large measure of the earlier decision. The concern
of the Toscanino court went to the entire process by which the de-
fendant came to stand before the district court. In fact, Toscanino's
detention in Brazil was merely a stopover on his way to the United
States, and the court of appeals most definitely was addressing it-
self to the total lack of regularity in the manner of the defendant's
transfer to the court; what the court characterized as the "fla-
grantly illegal law enforcement practices. 97
95. See cases cited note 46 supra. In each of these cases, the court ruled
that the violation of a treaty, which resulted in the presence of the de-
fendant before the tribunal, would call for the court to withhold the exer-
cise of jurisdiction.
96. 500 F.2d at 278.
To insure that it had not announced a rule without prescribing a remedy,
the court found that:
[T]he Ker-Frisbie rule cannot be reconciled with the Supreme
Court's expansion of the concept of due process, which now protects
the accused against pretrial illegality by denying to the government
the fruits of its own exploitation of any deliberate and unnecessary
lawlessness on its part.
Accordingly we view due process as now requiring a court to divest
itself of jurisdiction.... Id. at 275.
97. See text accompanying note 76 supra.
Quite clearly the Lujan decision was intended to narrow the ap-
plicable scope of the Toscanino opinion to those cases where brutal
and outrageous police behavior resulted in the court obtaining juris-
diction. However, Lujan is no better reasoned than those decisions
that have applied Ker-Frisbie by rote, and ignored the Cook-
Rauscher line of cases as well as modern notions of criminal due
process and international law. To that extent, Lujan is an unfor-
tunate limitation on a truly enlightened and progressive decision.
In the wake of Toscanino and Lujan there can be no doubt that
the Ker-Frisbie holding, that due process does not require a court
to examine the manner in which jurisdiction is obtained over a
criminal defendant, is no longer a tenable position. While Lujan
would suggest that only brutal and outrageous conduct by law en-
forcement officials will result in the denial of jurisdiction, Toscan-
ino has at least offered a sound argument for denying the prosecu-
tion a forum98 when jurisdiction is obtained pursuant to a demon-
strably unnecessary extra-legal transfer.9 9 The progress of our
98. The decision in Toscanino that the trial court should withhold the
exercise of jurisdiction is not to be read as a permanent bar to the proceed-
ings~against the defendant. Rather, the illegality could be cured by restor-
ing the status quo ante, which could be accomplished by returning the de-
fendant to the country from which he was abducted. This is precisely the
remedy fashioned by the Court in the Rauscher case:
[H]e shall not be arrested or tried for any other offense than that
which he was charged in those proceedings, until he shall have had
a reasonable time to return unmolested to the country from which
he was brought. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 424.
This is the remedy which the courts effected in Ford v. United States,
273 U.S. 593 (1927); United States v. Schouweiler, 19 F.2d 387 (S.D. Cal.
1927); United States v. Ferris, 19 F.2d 925 (N.D. Cal. 1927) and Dominguez
v. State, 90 Tex. Crim. 90, 234 S.W. 79 (1921). Once the defendant is re-
turned to the "asylum" country, an orderly and lawful extradition process
can-be initiated. This should not be viewed as a mere token process. Once
in his own country, the defendant normally has the right to oppose extradi-
tion in his own domestic courts. See S. BEDI, EXTRADITION 3N INTERNATIONAL
LAw Am PRA C cE 139 (1966).I If the defendant is a resident alien or on visa in the "asylum" country,
as was Toscanino, he may be denied re-entry and should therefore be per-
nfitted to return to his homeland.
A more perplexing situation is presented when the defendant is an Amer-
ican citizen. See, e.g., Chandler v. United States, 171 F.2d 921 (1st Cir.
1948). 'In such a case there is little chance that the foreign government
would permit the party's return. If the foreign government refuses re-en-
try, the defendant should be granted a reasonable opportunity to relocate
himself. Although this remedy may not be as effective as that applied to
foreign nationals, it bears noting that the American citizen did not originally
enjoy a right of asylum in the foreign nation. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. at
442.
99. It is a well-established precept of international law that an extraor-
dinary or extra-legal process will not be valid unless all ordinary proce-
dures are first exhausted. See The Interhandel Case, [1959] I.C.J. 6.
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laws and the advancement of the international legal community ar-
gues persuasively for a concept of due process of law that extends
beyond national boundaries.100 To the extent that Toscanino evi-
dences this enlightened view, its holding warrants further consider-
ation.101
CONCLUSION
It is difficult to reconcile the sensitivity of our courts in the face
of abduction of United States citizens and foreign nationals found
within this country'102 with the callous attitude our courts take to-
ward those criminal defendants who are abducted from foreign sov-
ereignties and brought here against their will. In this respect, Jus-
tice Brandeis' grim warning in Olmstead v. United States'0 3 that
"[o]ur government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For
good or ill, it teaches the whole people by its example," takes on
international implications when our courts sanction governmental
activity that violates the common law shared by all men and all
nations.
As a matter of law, the Ker-Frisbie rule is difficult to square
with the development of both our own law and the law of nations.
As a matter of justice, the rule is simply inexcusable; as a matter
of practicality, the rule is senseless. The United States has treaties
of extradition with almost every sovereign country on the globe
and there is no reason why such treaties cannot serve as the means
for returning wanted fugitives to justice. In an age of international
terrorism, such governmental lawlessness is deplorable.
United States v. Toscanino' °4 took a deep, learned look at the
rule and its broad implications in the modern system of criminal
justice and international law; in light of these considerations the
100. See generally Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
101. The criticism of the rule by the Third Circuit in Government of the
Virgin Islands v. Ortiz, 427 F.2d 1043 (3d Cir. 1970) and the Ninth Circuit
in United States v. Cotten, 471 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1973), see text accompany-
ing notes 56 & 58 supra, suggests that the Toscanino decision may be revi-
talized within these circuits. See Sanders v. Conine, 506 F.2d 530 (1974).
102. See The Cantu Case (1914), reported in II G. HAcxwoRTa DIGEST
or INTowATIONAL LAw 310 (1941); and see The Case of Blatt and Con-
verse (1911), id. at 309.
103. 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928).
104. 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).
rule was simply found untenable. Toscanino makes it clear that
our courts can-no longer sanction illegal government conduct, re-
gardless of where in the world it takes place, and irrespective of
the costs to the system when the law is not followed. It is sub-
mitted that the decision in Toscanino exemplifies the most enlight-
ened view of the role and power of a court in the modern world.
GARY W. SCHONS
